Western University

Scholarship@Western
Master of Studies in Law Research Papers
Repository

Law School

January 2018

Myths and Misogyny: The Legal Response to Sexual Assault
Rose Mary Lynn Ubell
Western University

Supervisor: Melanie Randall
University of Western Ontario

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/mslp
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ubell, Rose Mary Lynn, "Myths and Misogyny: The Legal Response to Sexual Assault" (2018). Master of
Studies in Law Research Papers Repository. 4.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/mslp/4

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Scholarship@Western. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master of Studies in Law Research Papers Repository by an authorized
administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
Sexual assault is a persistent form of violence against women that is rooted in
gender inequality. It violates the sexual integrity of the victim and can have lasting
psychological and emotional effects on both victims and their families. Sexual assault is
a significant social and cultural problem within Canadian society. This paper presents an
examination of the problems with the legal response to sexual assault that are still
prevalent within the Canadian justice system despite the many positive changes in law
that have come about in the last three decades. It is divided into three main chapters.
The first draws on literature from diverse disciplines to examine the ways in which rape
myths continue to have a profound influence on the legal response to sexual assault. The
second chapter looks specifically at the legal rules surrounding sexual history evidence
and the production of third party records in sexual assault cases and the ways in which
the application of these rules is fraught with complications and deficiencies that severely
prejudice and harm victims of sexual assault. The third chapter presents an examination
of the dubious tactics used by defence lawyers to undermine sexual assault complainants
in the courtroom. Additionally, the physicality of the courtroom is assessed to
demonstrate the ways in which the courtroom’s physical space and its rituals made the
courtroom a frightening place for sexual assault victims.

Key Words
Sexual Assault, Rape, Sexual Assault Victims, Criminal Justice, Third Party Records,
Rape Myths, Sexual History Evidence, Hostile Courtroom, Gendered Violence, Sexual
Consent, Victim Blaming, Law Reform.
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Preface
“Every story tells a story that has already been told.”1
As a victim/survivor of sexual assault, embarking on this project has been a
personal journey through which I hoped to find some measure of healing through
developing an understanding of the legal processes surrounding sexual assault.
As a child, I was sexually abused by my step-father over a continuous four-year
period. As an adult, I was sexually assaulted by an intimate partner. The relationship
between the two instances of abuse, by two different men, is perhaps inextricably linked.
If not for the emotional and psychological harm caused by the childhood abuse, perhaps I
would not have found myself in a financially, emotionally, and sexually abusive
relationship as an adult. This is of course a supposition. We cannot know definitively
what life events bring us to places of joy and sorrow, or how these events affect our
choices along life’s path.
After many years of contemplating and struggling with the emotions surrounding
my childhood sexual abuse, I realized that there had never been closure. In the deep
recesses of my mind, the incidences of abuse had never really ended. Although my stepfather had been charged, and there was a preliminary hearing (during which he looked
directly at my Mother and I and pled not guilty), the case did not make it to trial. Rather,
before the trial (in the late 1970’s), a body was found, burnt beyond recognition, in an
abandoned warehouse in Dryden, Ontario. The body was identified as that of my stepfather using the items of jewelry found on it: a chain with a pendant, a watch and two
rings. However, there always remained some question about whether the body was his.

1

Umberto Eco, “Postscript” in The Name of the Rose (New York: Mariner Books, 2014).
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With regards to my more recent sexual assault, there was a form of closure. My
former partner was charged, eventually pled guilty, and was sentenced, fined and placed
on the National Sex Offender Registry for 20 years. (The Registry was established by the
Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA)). He has also been placed on
probation for a period of three years following his release from incarceration, during
which time he is not allowed any contact with me. The period leading up to the final
dissolution of the relationship and the trial was incredibly difficult. I was often asked,
(mainly by his friends and family) in a critical and disbelieving fashion, “How could that
be a sexual assault? He was your partner; it’s not like you hadn’t done it before!” What
they had failed to understand is that, while the sexual assault may have been an act
almost identical in its motions, it was utterly different in its essence. It was not a
consensual, intimate act, but rather an act of aggression and violation.
In opening this preface, I have chosen to use both the words ‘victim’ and
‘survivor.’ In relation to sexual assault, the word ‘survivor’ has become preferable to
‘victim’ as ‘survivor’ is perceived as being empowering, while ‘victim’ connotes visions
of helplessness. However, neither terms sit well with me. Both are lacking some
essential essence which is difficult to describe. There is something in between the ideas
of victim and survivor that is both, and yet neither. It is a liminal space that is difficult to
label with any precision, and it is perhaps for this reason that any attempt to give the
space a name produces emotional and intellectual turmoil. There are times when I would
rather identify as victim. Identifying as victim removes the self-blame (however
temporarily) that often creeps into my thoughts. At other times, I would rather identify as

vi

a survivor, empowered and strong. Forgiveness however, is not a single act, but a matter
of constant practice.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Sexual violence is a pervasive, systemic method of creating and sustaining male
dominance over women.”2
Sexual assault is a persistent form of violence against women that is rooted in
gender inequality. It violates the sexual integrity of the victim and can have lasting
psychological and emotional effects on both victims and their families. Sexual assault is
a significant social and cultural problem within Canadian society. For example, it is
estimated that one in three Canadian women will experience sexual violence at some
point during their adult life. Additionally, women are eleven times more likely than men
to be victims of sexual assault.3 As Hodgson and Kelley observe, “sexual violence
pervades a ‘sexual mystique’ that is rooted in traditional, historical, cultural and
legislative responses.”4 For example, within a historical context, a man could not be
charged with raping his wife as she was relegated as the property of the husband.
Although, over the past three and a half decades, there has been much legislative reform
regarding the laws surrounding sexual violence, (e.g. since 1983 a husband can be
charged with sexually assaulting his wife) problems persist with the legal response to
sexual assault.

2

Karen Busby, “Sex Was in the Air - Pernicious Myths and Other Problems with Sexual Violence
Prosecutions" in Locating Law, Elizabeth Comack, ed, 259 (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2014) at 258.
3
Ontario Ministry of the Status of Women, Statistics: Sexual Violence (Toronto: Government of Ontario)
accessed 01 August 2017. http://www.women.gov.on.ca/owd/english/endingviolence/sexual_violence.shtml.
4
Hodgson, James F. & Debra S. Kelley, “Sexual Violence: Policies, Practices, and Changes” in James F.
Hodgson & Debra S. Kelley, eds, Sexual Violence: Policies, Practices and Challenges in the United States
and Canada (London: Praeger, 2002) at 2.
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The legal system has an essential role in eliminating the gender inequalities that
reinforce sexual stereotypes and myths about sexual violence. This paper presents an
examination of the problems with the legal response to sexual assault that remain
prevalent within the justice system, despite the many positive changes in law that have
come about in the last 34 years. For without an understanding of the issues and how they
affect the victims/survivors of sexual assault, we cannot hope to find solutions.
In Chapter 2: Rape Myths, Patriarchal Fables and the Justice System, I draw on
literature from diverse disciplines, including law, history, religion, criminology, media
studies, women’s studies and sociology to examine rape myths with a view to
demonstrating how these deeply embedded myths continue to have a profound influence
on the legal response to sexual assault, despite the robust legislative framework
surrounding sexual assault law that has developed in Canada over the past thirty-plus
years. These myths and stereotypes continue to surface at all levels of the criminal justice
system. They serve to discredit victims and filter cases out of the system, and thus present
a significant barrier to access to justice for victims of sexual assault.
Chapter 3: Substantive Issues in the Law of Sexual Assault: The Maintenance of
the Myths, looks specifically at the legal rules surrounding sexual history evidence and
the production of third party records in sexual assault cases. In this chapter, I
demonstrate that, despite the robust appearance of the law on the books, the application
of the law is fraught with complications and deficiencies that severely prejudice and harm
victims of sexual assault.
Chapter 4: Sexual Assault on Trial: Hostile Defence Tactics and the Intimidating
Courtroom, presents an examination of the dubious tactics used by defence lawyers to

3
undermine sexual assault complainants in the courtroom. In this chapter, I also examine
the physicality of the courtroom itself to demonstrate the ways in which both the
courtroom’s physical space and its rituals make the courtroom a frightening place for
sexual assault victims. Additionally, I question whether the adversarial system is
appropriate for the trial of sexual assault cases.

4

Chapter 2: Rape Myths - Patriarchal Fables, Sexual Assault and the
Justice System
“Western culture is…thoroughly misogynistic…And the ultimate source and
sanction of misogyny is Judeo-Christianity, with its foundation myth of Eve, mere
spare rib, yet the source of all sexual temptation, shame and sin; the scarlet
woman justly scapegoated for the miseries of mankind.”5
Introduction
It is no surprise that rape myths emanate from patriarchal systems in which the
evolution of cultural beliefs has been strongly influenced by religion.6 The Bible depicts
women as sources of temptation that entice unwary men into sin.7 Mary, the paragon of
female virtue for Christians, miraculously conceived a child while remaining a virgin.
Throughout history women have been blamed for, and have borne the burden of
managing, the sexual urges of men. For example, until the latter half of the twentiethcentury, women were consigned to private spaces where they could not “tempt”
respectable men with their feminine charms. To protect men from their own sexual
thoughts, women were (and in many cases still are) expected to disguise their femininity

Roy Porter, “Does Rape Have a Historical Meaning?” in Sylvana Tomaselli & Roy Porter, eds, Rape: An
Historical and Cultural Inquiry (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 216 at 233. It is understood that both
men and women can be, and are, sexually assaulted. However, as the victims are disproportionately women
and the perpetrators disporportionally men, this paper will reflect that disparity by focusing on the
experience of women.
6
Ranae Franiuk & Shain E. Ashley, “Beyond Christianity: The Status of Women and Rape Myths” (2011)
65 Sex Roles 783 at 783.
7
The following selected examples of the misogynistic depiction of women are from the King James Bible:
“Did not Solomon king of Israel sin by these things? Yet among many nations was there no king like him,
who was beloved of his God, and God made him king over all Israel: nevertheless even him did outlandish
women cause to sin.” (Nehemiah 13:26); “Lust not after her beauty in thine heart; neither let her take thee
with her eyelids.” (Proverbs 6:25) “With her much fair speech she caused him to yield, with the flattering
of her lips she forced him.” (Proverbs 7:21); For the lips of a strange woman drop as an honeycomb, and
her mouth is smoother than oil; But her end is bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword. Her feet
go down to death; her steps take hold on hell. Lest thou shouldest [sic] ponder the path of her life, her
ways are unmoveable, that thou canst not know them.” (Proverbs 5:3-6) “But I would have you know, that
the head of every man is Christ; and the head of every woman is the man.” (1 Corinthians 11:3). “Neither
was the man created for the woman; but the woman for the man.” (1 Corinthians 11:9) There are many
such examples in the Bible; however, a thorough survey is beyond the scope of this paper.
5
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by covering their bodies, thereby ridding themselves of even the smallest evidence of
their own sexuality. A woman who dares digress from the patriarchal paradigm of
female virtuosity is seen to be “asking for it.” Although there is a formal separation of
church and state in Western countries, and many people are moving away from religion,
these deep seated misogynistic beliefs that can be traced back thousands of years,8
continue to influence the Canadian legal system’s response to sexual assault, both
directly and indirectly.
This chapter, drawing on the literature from diverse disciplines including law,
history, religion, criminology, media studies, women’s studies, and sociology examines
rape myths with a view to demonstrating how these deeply embedded myths continue to
have a profound influence on legal responses to sexual assault, despite the robust
legislative framework surrounding sexual assault law that has developed in Canada over
the past thirty-plus years. These myths and stereotypes continue to surface at all levels of
the criminal justice system. They serve to discredit victims and filter cases out of the
system, and thus they present a significant barrier to access to justice for victims of
sexual assault. Additionally, when the justice system sustains these myths, it serves to
further entrench misogynistic ideals about the relations between men and women into the
very fabric of society, thereby affirming the rape culture that the laws are intended to
dismantle.

For information on the history of misogyny, see Jack Holland, A Brief History of Misogyny: The World’s
Oldest Prejudice (London: Robinson, 2006). Holland traces the beginnings of misogyny to sometime in
the eight-century BC in the Eastern Mediterranean region.
8
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Defining Sexual Assault and Rape
In 1983, the terms rape and indecent assault were replaced with a tripartite
structure of sexual assault within The Criminal Code of Canada.9 This re-classification
of acts of sexual violence as “assaults” draws attention to the physical and violent nature
of the act and incorporates sexual offences beyond forced penile-vaginal intercourse
(previously classified as rape). Moving from the term “rape” to “sexual assault” also
rendered sexual offences to be more gender inclusive, as not all victims are female. The
definition of sexual assault in the Criminal Code is broad and includes all unwanted
sexual activity, such as unwanted sexual touching, kissing, and fondling as well as sexual
penetration.
Consent is a key element of the offence of sexual assault, as sexual activity is only
legal if both parties consent. Consent is defined in s. 273(1) of the Criminal Code as “the
voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question.”10
The responsibility for ensuring that there is consent rests on the person who is initiating
or pursuing sexual activity. For a sexual act to be legal, consent must be affirmatively
communicated. In accordance with the Criminal Code, no consent is obtained where:

9

The Criminal Code of Canada classifies sexual assault into three different levels:
Level 1: (s. 271 - Sexual Assault) Any form of sexual activity forced on another person (i.e., sexual
activity without consent), or non-consensual bodily contact for a sexual purpose (e.g., kissing, touching,
oral sex, vaginal or anal intercourse). Level 1 sexual assault involves minor physical injury or no injury to
the victim. Conviction for a level 1 sexual assault is punishable by up to 10 years in prison.
Level 2: (s. 272 – Sexual Assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) A
sexual assault in which the perpetrator uses or threatens to use a weapon, threatens the victim’s friends or
family members, causes bodily harm to the victim, or commits the assault with another person (multiple
assailants). Conviction for a level 2 sexual assault is punishable by up to 14 years in prison.
Level 3: (s. 273 - Aggravated sexual assault) A sexual assault that wounds, maims, or disfigures the
victim, or endangers the victim’s life. Conviction for a level 3 sexual assault is punishable by up to life in
prison.
10
Criminal Code RSC 1985, c C-46 s 273(1).
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(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the
complainant;
(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity;
(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a
position or trust, power, or authority;
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to
engage in the activity; or
(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by
words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.11
Additionally, no one can consent in advance to sexual activity in the future when they
will be unconscious.12
Other important changes to the Criminal Code in 1983 included restrictions
placed on the admissibility of a victim’s prior sexual history (known as Rape Shield
laws), and the elimination of immunity for sexual assault by a spouse. The substantive
issues in the law of sexual assault are covered in more depth in Chapter 2 of this paper.
For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘rape’ is used to encompass all forms of sexual
assault.
Defining Rape Myths and Stereotypes
The concept of rape myths was introduced in the 1970’s by both sociologists13
and feminists. In her groundbreaking work, Susan Brownmiller notes:
The male myths of rape appear as cornerstones in most pseudoscientific inquiries
into female sexuality; they are quoted by many so-called “experts” on the sex
11

Ibid., s 273 (2)
See R v J.A. 2011 SCC 28.
13
J.R. Schwendinger & H. Schwendinger, “Rape Myths: In Legal, Theoretical, and Everyday Practice”
(1974) 1 Crime and Social Justice 27 at 18.
12
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offender. They crop up in literature; they charge the cannons of the dirty
jokesters. They deliberately obscure the true nature of rape.14
Grubb and Turner observe that “rape myths vary among societies and cultures; however,
they consistently follow a pattern whereby, they blame the victim for their rape, express a
disbelief in claims of rape, exonerate the perpetrator and allude that only certain types of
women are raped.”15
The construct of rape myths however, was not formally defined until 1980 by
social scientist Martha Burt.16 Burt defined rape myths as “prejudicial, stereotyped, or
false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists [that create] a climate hostile to rape
victims.”17 Burt also posited that “the hypothesized net effect of rape myths is to deny or
reduce perceived injury or to blame the victims for their own victimization.”18 However,
psychologists Lonsway and Fitzgerald, argue that this is inadequate as a formal definition
as it fails to convey the meaning of the term “myth” and does not fully describe the ways
in which the ‘false beliefs’ are prejudicial and towards whom.19 Lonsway and Fitzgerald
define myths as ‘false or apocryphal beliefs that are widely held; they explain some
important cultural phenomenon; and they serve to justify existing cultural
arrangements.”20 Combining this definition of myths with cultural theories of rape,
Lonsway and Fitzgerald have proposed a more robust definition of rape myths: “attitudes

14

Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1975) at
312.
15
Amy Grubb & Emily Turner, "Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: A Review of the Impact of Rape
Myth Acceptance, Gender Role Conformity and Substance Use on Victim Blaming" 2012) 17:5 Aggression
and Violent Behavior 443 at 445.
16
Schwendinger , supra note 13 at 28.
17
Martha R. Burt, "Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape" (1980) 38:2 Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 217 at 217. Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, "Rape Myths" (1994) 18
Psychology of Women Quarterly 133 at 134. Laura L. Finely, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Assault in
Popular Culture (Denver, CO: Praeger, 2016) at 67.
18
Ibid., at 217.
19
Lonsway & Fitzgerald at 134.
20
Ibid.

9
and beliefs that are generally false but are widely and persistently held, and serve to deny
and justify male sexual aggression against women.”21
Former Supreme Court Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé defines myths and
stereotypes as “irrational, nonscientific narratives used by human beings to explain what
they do not fully understand.”22 L’Heureux-Dubé further asserts that “myths and
stereotypes divorce the law from contemporary knowledge because they have more to do
with fiction and generalization that with reality [and] they are therefore, incompatible
with the truth seeking function of the legal system.”23 She provides several examples of
myths and stereotypes that have been recognized and highlighted by the Supreme Court
of Canada as having “skewed the law’s treatment of sexual assault claimants:”24


the rapist is always a stranger, never a friend or relative;



women are less reliable and credible as witnesses if they have previous sexual
relations;



women are more likely to have consented to sexual advances if they have had
sexual relations in the past; (These last two myths in combination have been
dubbed the ‘twin myths’ – women who have previous sexual experience are more
likely to have consented and are less credible.)25



21

a woman will always struggle to defend her honour;

Ibid. (emphasis in original)
Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, "Beyond the Myths: Equality, Impartiality, and Justice" (2010) 10:1 Journal of
Social Distress and the Homeless 87 at 89.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 276. See also Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility,
and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22:2 Canadian Journal of Women
and the Law 397 at 402.
22

10


women are “more emotional” than males so unless they become hysterical,
nothing must have happened;



women mean “yes” even when they say “no;”



women deserve to be raped on account of their conduct, dress and demeanor; and



women fantasize about rape and therefore fabricate reports of sexual activity even
though nothing happened.26

These are but a few examples of the myths and stereotypes that pervade the legal system
at all levels. There are many more. The legal processes used to respond to sexual assault
are infused with these deep-rooted myths about the nature of sexuality and sexual
relations between men and women. These misguided responses serve to “reify the very
social dynamics that produce sexual violence.”27 As Pringle observes, “the conduct of
trials and the words of judges convey ideas about love and justice which powerfully
shape our perceptions of what is acceptable and reasonable in our intimate lives.”28
Rape Myths and Legal Fictions
We can draw comparisons between rape myths and legal fictions. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines a legal fiction as “an assumption that something is true even though it
may be untrue…a device by which a legal rule or institution is diverted from its original
purpose to accomplish indirectly some other object.”29 In other words, “it is a
supposition or postulation that something is true regardless of whether or not it is.”30 For

L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 22 at 89-90. These myths and streotypes have been highlighted in cases
such as R v Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577, R v Osolin [1993] 4 SCR 595, R v Esau [1997] 2 SCR 777, R v
Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330, R v W.(G.) [1999] 3 SCR 597 and, R v A.G. 2000 SCC 17.
27
Elaine Craig, "The Inhospitable Court" (2016) 66:2 The University of Toronto Law Journal 197 at 242.
28
Helen Pringle, "Acting Like a Man: Seduction and Rape in the Law" (1993) 2:1 Griffith Law Review 64
at 74.
29
Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed, sub verbo “legal fiction.”
30
Raymond Wacks. Understanding Jurisprudence, 4th ed. (Oxford: oxford University Press, 2015) at 234.
26
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example, the now defunct legal doctrine of coverture or femme couverte created the legal
fiction that a husband and wife were one person in law; thus, a woman’s legal rights and
obligations were subsumed by her husband. The doctrine is best described by English
judge and jurist, Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection,
and cover, she performs every thing [sic]; and is therefore called in our law-french a
feme-covert . . . under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord;
and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture…31

The legal doctrine of coverture (and the legal fiction it created) was enshrined in
the common law of England and many Commonwealth jurisdictions for centuries. This
‘covering’ of a wife’s legal identity by her husband served to subordinate women within
marriage. Conversely, a femme sole (an unmarried woman) had the right to own property
and enter into contracts in her own name. While an in-depth discussion of coverture and
the legal fiction it created is outside the scope of this paper, this example serves not only
to provide an illustration of a legal fiction, but also to demonstrate the ways in which
legal fictions have been applied to subordinate women’s interests to those of men.
Additionally, the doctrine of coverture was instrumental in affirming a husband’s marital
immunity to the charge of rape. In fact, the courts took the words of seventeenth-century
jurist Sir Mathew Hale as axiomatic until the latter half of the twentieth century: “The
husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their

31

William Blackstone, Wilfred Prest, ed., “Of Husband and Wife,” The Oxford Edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 442.
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mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself in this kind unto the
husband which she cannot retract.”32
English philosopher John Stewart Mill (1806-1873), recognized the perilous
position that married women occupied because they had no legal rights. In his The
Subjection of Women, Mill noted that a husband can claim from his wife “the lowest
degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function
contrary to her inclinations…the vilest malefactor has some wretched woman tied to him
against whom he can commit any atrocity…”33 Although wife rape was criminalized in
Canada in 1983, there still appears to be confusion in the application of the law
concerning sexual assault in intimate relationships.34 As Professor Melanie Randall
observed, an analysis of several cases revealed a reassertion of “an assumption about an
entitlement to sexual access within marriage, or, put differently, an immunity to criminal
culpability for those who sexually transgress in the context of a spousal relationship.”35
Thus, the now defunct doctrine of coverture and the legal fiction it created, continues to
have an influence on the contemporary patriarchal ideologies that legitimate power
relations between men and women.
In 1891, an anonymous English lawyer observed, “any one [sic] who applies his
mind to the state of the law, even at the present day, as between men and women, will be
astonished and horrified to find out how completely the female interest is sacrificed

32

Matthew Hale. The History of the Pleas of the Crown. 1st American Ed. (Philadelphia: Robert H. Small,
1847) Vol 1 at 629. Qtd in Pringle, supra note 28 at 65.
33
John Stewart Mill, The Subjection of Women, (Cambridge: Penguin Classics, 2011) at ch 2.
34
In 1977, South Australia was the first Commonwealth jurisdiction to remove the marital exemption from
sexual offences. See An Act to Amend the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935-1975. No. 83 of 1976,
sect 7(a) (4-5) and South Australia, Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Commission, Special Report,
Rape and Other Offences (March 1976) at 14.
35
Melanie Randall, "Sexual Assault in Spousal Relationships, "Continuous consent", and the Law: Honest
But Mistaken Judicial Beliefs" (2008) 32:2 Manitoba Law Journal 144 at 180.
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whenever it happens to clash with that of the male.”36 When it comes to the application
of sexual assault law, this statement remains true today. Although the Supreme Court of
Canada has recognized that mythical assumptions about female sexuality and sexual
assault serve to deny women’s sexual autonomy, rape myths continue to crop up at all
levels of the justice system.37
The Myths
Rape myths are multilayered and have many functions. They serve to deny and/or
trivialize sexual violence perpetrated by men against women; they shift the blame from
the rapist to the victim; they exonerate sexually aggressive men and they contribute to the
oppression and social control of women. Rape myths and stereotypes “underlie and fuel
sexual violence against women and inform negative societal reactions.”38 Karen Busby
noted that “over the last three decades, the feminist anti-rape movement has helped us to
understand sexual violence as a pervasive, systemic method of creating and sustaining
male dominance over women which also exacerbates other manifestations of social
inequality.”39 Yet, as Joanne Conaghan points out, “removing the doctrinal debris of a
legally instituted gendered hierarchical order does not necessarily get rid of deeply
ingrained social and cultural attitudes which law has long endorsed and which continue to

36

Anonymous Lawyer, The Law in Relation to Women (London: Alexander Gardner, 1891) at 2. A prosuffrage pamphlet from the Gerritsen Collection of Aletta H. Jacobs. The collection contains books,
pamphlets and peridocals “reflecting the evolution of a feminist consciousness and the movement for
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infuse the criminal justice process, albeit in more covert, less accessible forms.”40 How
then, do we address these myths that continue to exert such power over the legal
processes surrounding sexual assault? The first step, is to recognize and acknowledge the
myths and understand the ways in which rape myths promote victim blaming and the
stigmatization of sexual assault.
Payne, Lonsway and Fitzgerald have identified seven distinct categories under
which rape myths fall:
1. she asked for it;
2. it wasn’t really rape;
3. he didn’t mean to;
4. she wanted it;
5. she lied;
6. rape is a trivial event; and
7. rape is a deviant event.41
While these categories are useful for analyzing and observing the complexities of the
interplay between similar myths and stereotypes, it is impossible to definitively assign
each myth to one category. Many of the myths flow between categories and intersect
with each other to create new myths that again defy categorization. Despite the
multifaceted nature of rape myths and the difficulties inherent in assigning each to a
single specific category, the category construct is a useful tool for delineating, sorting and
deconstructing rape myths. Hence, I will use these categories as a means to discuss the
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myths and stereotypes that each category represents, as well as the various mythical
subtexts within each.
1. She Asked For It
This is perhaps the most pervasive of the seven categories. The myths and
stereotypes in this category decree that victims are responsible through their own actions
for their victimization; the woman’s behaviour is singled out, not that of the perpetrator.
These actions come in many forms: walking alone late at night, dressing ‘provocatively,’
flirting, wearing make-up, going to bars alone, drinking alcohol, and leaving a drink
unattended are but a few.42 Clothing is often used to cast doubt on the character of the
victim. Take for example, the comments of former Alberta Court of Appeal Justice John
McClung43 made in a foundational 1998 sexual assault case (R v Ewanchuk): “it must be
pointed out that the complainant did not present herself…in a bonnet and crinolines.”44
Sterling analyzed three American trials in which clothing was used to discredit
the victim. In one case, the complainant had been wearing a mini skirt and no underwear
when she was sexually assaulted. Months later, the jury in the trial handed down a
verdict of ‘not guilty,’ the jury foreman later stated that she had ‘asked for it.’45 In
another instance, the victim was wearing a high-necked cocktail dress trimmed with
bright colours, black panty hose and a black lace bra and panties. At trial, defence
counsel made sure that the Victoria’s Secret tags on the clothing were visible in the
photographs shown to the jury.46 Young and Sterling both contend that the focus in court
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on a rape victim’s clothing infers that clothing and bodily appearance are preeminent
sources of information that project a “semiotic message about the woman’s moral
character.”47 However, the probative function of clothing is highly indeterminate,
particularly when it is used to cast doubt on the character of the victim.48
Behaviour that is morally suspicious, such as drug use, having had an abortion,
and alcohol use, also casts shadows on a victim’s credibility. For example, Young
observes that “a woman with a drinking problem does not need to be a prostitute to have
a promiscuous image. She is considered promiscuous by the very fact that she is a
drinker.”49 In other words, alcohol use by women insinuates dubious moral character.
Additionally, as alcohol is equated with having a ‘good time,’ a woman who consumes
alcohol is perceived as a ‘good time girl.’ In a 2005 study from the University of
Nottingham in the United Kingdom, Finch and Munro “found that participants in a
simulated trial and in focus groups tended to attribute responsibility for the ensuing
sexual intercourse to the complainant when she had consumed alcohol.”50 In another
article, Finch and Munro note “the existence of a double standard in the attribution of
responsibility in contested sexual consent scenarios whereby intoxicated defendants tend
to be held less responsible for subsequent sexual events than their sober counterparts
while intoxicated complainants tend to be held more responsible.”51 Studies have also
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shown that American juries “have been much more likely to acquit the accused in a rape
trial where evidence is led showing that the victim consumed alcohol or drugs prior to the
rape.”52 Australian studies show that the complainant’s “drinking in the period preceding
the incident is frequently a major component of the defence’s case.”53 In addition,
clothing and alcohol are often used simultaneously to “impugn the character of the victim
and to imply consent.”54
Shifting the blame from the rapist to the victim also serves to protect “individuals
and society from confronting the reality and the extent of sexual assault.”55 Burt argues
that “rape myths are the mechanism that people use to justify dismissing an incident of
sexual assault from the category of ‘real’ rape.”56 Kathryn Ryan posits that rape myths
“may be a part of a cognitive scheme that reflect the belief in a just world… [thus
providing] comfort to women and men because they allow them to distance themselves
and their own behaviour from the possibility of being victims or perpetrators of rape.”57
This ‘just world’ phenomenon is best described as “the predisposition to believe that the
world is a just place where good things happen to good people and bad things happen
only to those who deserve them.”58 To reinforce and protect this belief people search for
evidence that the victim deserved to be victimized – that she asked for it.
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2. It Wasn’t Really Rape
Many commonly accepted rape myths narrowly define what counts as rape.59
Consequently, there is often confusion about what constitutes ‘real rape.’ For example, it
was not really rape because there was no weapon involved; the victim did not sustain any
physical injuries; the perpetrator was not a stranger; the accused was her partner; she
didn’t raise the hue and cry; she didn’t fight back, and so on. Sexual assaults that do not
fit the ‘real rape’ script may be categorically dismissed as groundless. Ryan defines rape
scripts as “beliefs about the nature of rape (e.g., the location, weaponry, sex of
perpetrators), the roles of the sexes in rape, boundaries of vulnerability to rape, and the
disposition of the victims.”60 Further, the belief that a ‘real’ rape involves a sudden and
extreme physical attack from a stranger may interfere with the ability to recognize a
sexual assault that does not fit this paradigm (most sexual assaults do not).61 It may also
be perceived that a partner who has consented to sexual acts in the past must have
consented to the acts in question and that unwanted sex perpetrated by a partner isn’t
really rape. Ryan argues that the real rape script, constructed around myths and
stereotypes, is “an important part of the legal and criminal justice systems’ responses to
an alleged rape.”62
3. He Didn’t Mean To
It comes as no surprise that the myths in this category also serve to deny and
trivialize sexual assault and to remove blame from the male perpetrator. Victim blaming
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is subtler in this grouping of myths, but it is there nonetheless. Here we find assertions
that sexual assault is not assault at all, but rather, miscommunicated romantic signals, that
“men are guilty of incompetent message-decoding, rather than rape.” 63 It is this
incompetent message decoding that leads a man to believe that a woman’s ‘no’ really
means ‘yes,’ thus he is absolved of all guilt. Young argues that “rape trials are invested
with the notion that a woman’s surface is replete with messages transmitted to men”64
that are often difficult for men to decipher; thus, if he gets it wrong, he didn’t mean to.
We can also place in this category the myth that sexual assault is a result of
uncontrolled lust, not violence. Therefore, rape is erroneously perceived as the natural,
but uncontrollable, and therefore non-culpable, response of men to the seductive powers
of so-called “loose women.”65 A 2006 Australian survey revealed that “44 percent of
males and 32 percent females believed that rape results from men not being able to
control their need for sex…responsibility is therefore removed from men because it is not
within their control.”66 Pringle argues that underlying the myth of uncontrolled lust “is a
common idea about what a woman is and how to use one. This idea rests on a
commonplace fantasy, a fantasy that women and their bodies are there for the expression
of men’s needs…and judges and the law have played a decisive part in the construction
of this fantasy.”67
Shannon Sampert noted several stories in the Winnipeg Free Press that suggested
that the number of sexual assaults can be reduced if the perpetrators take medication to
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control their testosterone levels, thereby controlling their lustful urges. However,
reducing the violent behaviour of sexual offenders to mere chemistry “completely ignores
the power dynamic inherent in sexual violence”68 and further excuses the behaviour the
behaviour of men. That these articles appeared in a major newspaper in the last decade is
evidence of how deeply ingrained in our society the myth of uncontrolled male lust is.
4. She Wanted It
This category intersects with the myth she asked for it in many ways. It could in
fact, be argued that the two categories are different expressions of the same idea, as many
of the same mythical subtexts exist within each: provocative clothing, flirting, going
alone to a date’s home, drug and alcohol consumption, etcetera. There is however, a
subtle difference. She asked for it acknowledges the unwanted act, but places the blame
for the victimization squarely on the victim. Conversely, she wanted it is in many
respects comparable to it wasn’t really rape because…she wanted it. Here again we see
the allusion to miscommunicated messages and misunderstood romantic signals.
Also in this category is the myth that many women have an unconscious desire to
be raped. One of this myth’s earliest origins can be traced back to Herodotus, a Greek
historian in the fifth century B.C. who wrote: “Abducting young women is not, indeed a
lawful act; but it is stupid after the event to make a fuss about it. The only sensible thing
is to take no notice; for it is
obvious that no young woman allows herself to be [raped] if she does not want to be.”69
Thus, if a woman does not fight back, or does not raise the ‘hue and cry,’ she must be
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allowing the sexual encounter in order to fulfill her own sexual desires. The absence of
vaginal injury is also often used as evidence against women “as it is then assumed that if
she was able to self-lubricate, she must have enjoyed the forced sex act.”70 Edwards and
her co-authors observe that “beliefs that women desire forced sex have been incorporated
for centuries into mainstream cultural work in art, religion, law, literature, philosophy,
psychology and film.”71 For example, the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814) wrote numerous
erotic works in which he advocated the raping of women and insisted that women should
choose to enjoy the experience. As recently as the mid-twentieth century, Freudian
psychoanalytic theory was used to argue that “a woman’s need for sexual satisfaction
may lead to the unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to
avoid the guilt feeling which might arise after willing participation.”72 Today, the
pornography industry, along with other sexually explicit media continues to reinforce and
perpetuate the myth that women enjoy being sexually assaulted. A quick perusal of
several internet pornography sites using the keyword searches ‘force,’ ‘assault,’ and ‘tie,’
reveals numerous such rape scenes.73
5. She Lied
One of the most disturbing myths that falls neatly under this category is that if a
woman has been proven in a criminal court to have been previously abused, it is
perceived that “she has a disordered sexual perception that could lead to
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misinterpretations, overreactions and false criminal accusations.”74 Alternatively, if the
victim made previous allegations of prior abuse that did not result in a conviction,
defence counsel may use this to infer that the victim tends to lie.75 In 1992, section 276 of
the Criminal Code, an exclusionary rule prohibiting any party from adducing evidence of
past sexual activity, except under strict conditions and subject to judicial oversight, came
into effect. Despite the introduction of the rape shield laws, such evidence is still
“frequently used in one way or another in sexual violence proceedings.”76
Another disturbing myth, that women routinely lie about sexual assault and that
most charges of rape are unfounded, has also been proven erroneous. A 2009 review of
international research on the false reporting of sexual assault suggests that false reporting
happens in only two to eight percent of cases.77 There are many fables that intersect with
the ‘women lie’ myth: women are fickle and spiteful; women are not particularly
credible; women lie to protect their honour; women are vengeful and lie to avenge a
perceived wrong; women lie about sexual assault to perpetrate blackmail; women have
overactive imaginations, and so on. The myths surrounding the ‘women lie’ fallacy are as
innumerable as they are nonsensical. According to Statistics Canada, only one in ten
sexual assaults is reported to the police.78 There are numerous disincentives for not
reporting sexual violence including shame, self-blame, fear of one’s abuser, the
possibility of not being believed, the social stigma about anything related to sex, and the
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difficulties for victims that are inherent in the criminal justice process. These
disincentives are also disincentives to falsely reporting an assault. Why make an
accusation when only three in one thousand sexual assault complaints made to the police
lead to conviction?79
Another myth that is an intrinsic part of the ‘she lied’ category is that of delayed
disclosure or recent complaint. This myth revolves around the erroneous assumption that
a woman who is sexually assaulted will disclose her violation at the first reasonable
opportunity. Thus, at trial, a delay in disclosing an assault is often perceived as a
discrediting factor. This idea however, is premised on a mistaken belief about how
victims of sexual assault behave.80

The leading precedent on delayed disclosure is a

case in which a child was sexually assaulted when she was five to six years old. She told
no one about the events for two and a half years. At trial, defence counsel crossexamined the complainant on the lengthy delay in reporting, suggesting that she had
fabricated the story.81 The issue was “whether to admit expert evidence attesting to the
fact that in diagnosing cases of child sexual abuse, the timing of disclosure, standing
alone, signifies nothing…disclosure depends upon the circumstances of the particular
victim.”82 Justice Major for the majority stated:
The significance of the complainant’s failure to make a timely complaint must not be
the subject of any presumptive adverse inference based upon now rejected
stereotypical assumptions of how person…react to acts of sexual abuse. A trial judge
should recognize and so instruct a jury that there is no inviolable rule on how people
who are the victims of trauma like a sexual assault will behave. Some will make an
immediate complaint, some will delay in disclosing the abuse, while some will never
79
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disclose the abuse. Reasons for delay are many and at least include embarrassment,
fear, guilt, or a lack of understanding and knowledge. In assessing the credibility of a
complainant, the timing of the complaint is simply one circumstance to consider in the
factual mosaic of a particular case. A delay in disclosure, standing alone, will never
give rise to an adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant.83

Despite the precedent set in DD, recent complaint continues to be an area of
confusion in the law of evidence and is still used to damage a complainant’s
credibility. Elaine Craig notes that “given the assumption that women tend to lie
about rape, and the fact that credibility is the determining factor in most sexual
assault trials, a lack of recent complaint presumably does serve as a de facto bar to
prosecution.”84 For example, a 2006 study in Australia indicates that cases are
more likely to be prosecuted if reported sooner rather than later.85 Additionally,
there is concern that if the Crown relies on evidence of recent complaint to support
the complainant’s credibility, “it will paradoxically reinforce the very social
assumption it is intended to rebut – that victims who complain promptly are more
credible.”86
6. Rape is A Trivial Event
According to Statistics Canada, most sexual offences in Canada are of a less
severe nature.87 For example, data from 2004 and 2007 indicate “that most sexual
assaults involve unwanted sexual touching (81%) rather than more severe sexual attacks
(19%). Among the incidents that came to the attention of the police, the large majority
(86%) were level 1, the least serious form of sexual assault.”88 Statistics such as these
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may lead to a false assumption that sexual assault is a trivial event, a mere fondle or a pat
on the bum…what’s the big deal? However, trivializing sexual assault reinforces the idea
that women’s bodies are perpetually available to men, whether it be for a fondle or a
‘fuck.’ Pringle sums it up nicely “the cool judgement of the men of the world is this: if
women are not immediately available, they can be made so by a degree of gentle
violence, and an acquiescence in fear and trembling can be counted as consent…gentle
violence becomes foreplay.”89
Payne and her colleagues identify a number of other subtexts that trivialize rape
including: if a woman is willing to ‘make out’ with a guy, then it’s no big deal if he goes
a little further and has intercourse; it’s just sex; rape is not as big a problem as some
feminists would like people to believe; being raped is not as bad as being mugged and
beaten; women tend to exaggerate how much rape affects them; if a woman is not a
virgin, then it should not be a big deal if her date forces her to have sex; and, many socalled rape victims are actually women who had sex and ‘changed their minds’
afterwards.90 In short, “violence against women by men is normalized to the point that it
is viewed as mundane.”91
7. Rape is a Deviant Event
This myth fuels the erroneous belief that sexual assault is not a common
occurrence. It is rather a deviant event perpetrated by a perverted, ugly, seedy or insane
stranger – and that the stranger is the “other.” Journalist Helen Benedect observes a
widely-held misconception in the United States “that most rapes are committed by black
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men against white women.”92 In Canada, this “other” may be “Aboriginal, an immigrant,
some other visible minority, or a religious minority.”93 This myth is based upon the
assumption “that “normal” white Canadian men do not sexually assault women.”94 In her
examination of the ways in which Canadian newspaper report sexual assaults, Shannon
Sampert observes that “stories were coded under this category if the assailant was
described as a visible or religious minority, an immigrant, or someone who lives outside
of Canada.”95 This dangerous xenophobic tendency towards classifying non-white
assailants into the category of “other” serves to intensify racial biases and reinforce the
“mistaken understanding that women can recognize their rapists because they are the
“other.””96 However, most sexual assaults are perpetrated by friends, family and
acquaintances, not strangers.97 Additionally, Sampert notes that police ‘stranger danger’
warnings create a climate of fear that ensures a large degree of control over how and
where women conduct their lives.98 The reality is that most perpetrators are known to the
victims and most sexual assaults happen in a familiar place.
This category of myths intersects with all other categories. It suggests that
because rape is a deviant, and therefore uncommon event, there must be a
misunderstanding as to whether or not a sexual assault actually occurred – she must have
asked for it; it wasn’t really rape; he didn’t mean to; she wanted it; she lied; rape is
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trivial. Author Kate Harding has taken this list of seven myths and created a flow chart
that begins with someone reporting a sexual assault and proceeds as follows:
1. Did she ask for it? If no, go to 2. If yes, go to 8.
2. Was it really rape? If yes, go to 3. If no, go to 8.
3. Did he mean to do it? If yes, go to 4. If no, go to 8.
4. Did she want to have sex with him? If no, go to 5. If yes, go to 8.
5. Is she lying about whether she consented? If no, go to 6. If yes, go to 8.
6. Was it really such a big effing trauma? If yes, go to 7. If no, go to 8.
7. The kind of rape you are describing is very, very rare. Like, so rare that
it’s practically nonexistent. Go back over steps 1 through 6 until you find
your error and end up at 8.
8. Everything’s fine! No need to be upset!99
Conclusion
The above flow chart reflects the social assumptions that underlie and reinforce
rape myths and stereotypes. These persistent collective suppositions continue to inform
credibility assessments and, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, affect the
handling of sexual assault cases at all levels of the justice system. They are reflective of
the traditional common law definition of rape penned in the seventeenth-century by
English jurist Sir Matthew Hale: “rape is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho [sic] never so innocent.”100
These assumptions are often held at an unconscious level and have an effect not only on
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the legal process, but also on how men and women view their sexuality. Many men and
women continue to have a great difficulty in distinguishing between sexual assault and
sex.101 Inured within legal discourse is a formidable covert conviction “that a woman is
both sexual and indifferent, functioning more as a signal to others than as an autonomous
agent.”102 When these myths and stereotype are perpetuated in the legal system they are
further reinforced in society…it is a vicious and unwavering circle. However, these
myths cannot be perpetuated in the criminal justice system without police and judicial
complicity. So far, despite the robust legislation that has developed around sexual assault
law in Canada, myths and stereotypes continue to surface. Our current justice system
reflects the astute observation of Geis: “Hale’s strictures on rape [would not] have
lingered as long as they have were they not congruent with the views of the males who
dominate the criminal justice system.”103
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Chapter 3: Substantive Issues in the Law of Sexual Assault - The
Maintenance of the Myths
“Perhaps it is the only crime in which the victim becomes the accused and, in
reality, it is she who must prove her good reputation, her mental soundness,
and her impeccable propriety.”104
Freda Adler
Introduction
Sexual assault law in Canada has undergone significant progressive reforms since
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect in 1982.105 Prior to
introduction of the Act amending the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences that
followed the entrenchment of The Charter in the Canadian Constitution,106 the laws on
sexual offences were drafted in gendered and unequal terms that were inconsistent with
section 15(1) of the Charter.107 In 1983, in accordance with the Act, the narrowly defined
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offences of rape108 and indecent assault109 were replaced with a gender-neutral hierarchy
of sexual assault offences which build on the assault provisions of the Criminal Code.110
Additionally, the marital exemption was removed.111 The reforms also made significant
changes to evidentiary rules that had made the prosecution of sexual assaults incredibly
challenging. The common-law doctrine of recent complaint was abolished, as was the
requirement for corroboration.112 Sexual history evidence was made presumptively
inadmissible subject to three specific exceptions,113 and evidence of sexual reputation for
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http://www.constancebackhouse.ca/fileadmin/website/index.htm.
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110

See note 106.

Following are the three levels of sexual assault in the Criminal Code:
s. 271. Sexual assault;
s. 272 (1). Sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm;
s. 273 (1). Aggravated sexual assault.
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s. 274. Where an accused is charged with an offence under section 155 (incest), 161 (gross indecency),
271 (sexual assault), 272 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) or
273 (aggravated sexual assault), no corroboration is required for a conviction and the judge shall not
instruct the jury that it is unsafe to find the accused guilty in the absence of corroboration.
s. 275. The rules relating to evidence of recent complaint in sexual assault cases are hereby abrogated.
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1985 Criminal Code s.276. (1) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 271, 272 or 273, no
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(b) it is evidence of specific instances of the complainant’s sexual activity tending to establish the
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the purpose of challenging or supporting the credibility of the complainant was
prohibited.114
Despite these significant reforms, sexual assault continues to be the most
underreported crime in Canada. According to Statistics Canada, less than five percent of
sexual assaults in Canada are reported to the police, compared to 50 percent for break-ins
and just under 31 percent for all criminal incidents combined.115 Additionally, once
reported to the police, sexual offences are less likely than any other violent offences to be
considered by police to be “founded” and are less likely to result in charges being laid
against the suspect.116 A report published by the Globe and Mail in February 2017
following a 20 month investigation revealed that one out of every five sexual assault
allegations in Canada is dismissed by the police as being baseless and thus is categorized
as “unfounded.”117 Of those cases that do make it to court, only four in every ten result in
a conviction.118 “Even when there is a conviction obtained, conditional sentences are
more likely to be entered into for sexual assaults than for any other violent crime.”119

identity of the person who had sexual contact with the complainant on the occasion set out in the
charge;
(c) it is evidence of sexual activity that took place on the same occasion as the sexual activity that
forms the subject-matter of the charge, where that evidence relates to the consent that the accused
alleges he believed was given by the complainant. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 1980-81-82-83, c.125, s.
19.
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In this chapter, I examine from a feminist perspective, the legal rules surrounding
sexual history evidence and the production of third party records in sexual assault cases
(that is, records relating to personal information about the victim that are in the
possession of a third party such as counselling records, medical records, school records,
residential school records, psychiatrist hospital/treatment records, and records from drug
and alcohol treatment centers). I demonstrate that, despite the robust appearance of the
law on the books, the application of the law is fraught with complications and
deficiencies that severely prejudice and harm the victim, thereby providing inadequate
protection and undermining sexual equality. Karen Busby notes that “while non-lawyers
are more likely to recognize the contingencies and other flaws in law’s account of itself,
they run the risk of being branded by legal professionals as uninformed, unfair, and even
hysterical if they question the fairness of the process.”120 It is however, imperative that
feminists, both inside and outside the legal profession, continue to examine and monitor
the substantive issues in the law of sexual assault. Additionally, the individuals within
the justice system (police, lawyers, and judges) must look outside of the insular realm of
law to garner an understanding of how the application (or misapplication) of the law
further victimizes the victims of sexual assault.121
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The Foundations of Criminal Law
Before examining the application of the law with regards to sexual history evidence
and the production of third party records, it is necessary to briefly introduce the principles
of criminal law and the three foundational rules that support these principles. These rules
are often cited by critics of the procedures limiting the admission of complainants’ sexual
history evidence and third party records. The two fundamental principles that underpin
Canadian criminal procedural are that “criminal convictions are extremely serious and
therefore should only be obtained if there is a very high degree of certainty that an offence
was committed, [and that] the state, and especially the police, should be restrained from
using coercive tactics during investigations.”122 The three foundational rules that support
these principles are as follows: the person charged (the defendant) is innocent until proven
guilty; the Crown must prove the offence ‘beyond a reasonable doubt; and, the defendant
has the right to silence and the right to full answer and defence.123
Gendered Notions of Privacy
At the heart of the issue surrounding the defendant’s access and ability to adduce
evidence related to a complainant’s sexual history and her personal records is the
precarious balancing of a victim’s privacy with the defendant’s right to full answer and
defence. What must a woman reveal about herself in order to access justice for a wrong
committed against her, and how do these revelations subject her to further victimization?
Law professor Elizabeth Schneider notes the ways in which “concepts of privacy permit,
encourage, and reinforce violence against women.”124 For example, historically, the
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abuse of women in the family sphere was not addressed by the law as it was seen as a
“protected as part of the private sphere of family life.”125 Indeed, Lise Gotell calls
attention to the ways in which “the claim to privacy as a right is inescapably linked to the
gendered history of the public/private distinction…that was born not of woman, but of
man.”126 These “complicated, paradoxical and gendered legacies of privacy [continue to]
influence judicial determinations of the admissibility of sexual history evidence and
access to confidential records [and] overshadow decisions about which complainants will
be accorded protection against invasive credibility probing and about how much we need
to know about any complainant in order for her to meet the test of credibility.”127
Unfortunately, when it comes to the courts, the privacy rights of complainants continue to
be subordinated to the rights of the accused.
Sexual History Evidence
The 1983 amendments to the Criminal Code made sexual history evidence
inadmissible subject to three specific exceptions:
a) it is evidence that rebuts evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity or
absence thereof that was previously adduced by the prosecution;
b) it is evidence of specific instances of the complainant’s sexual activity
tending to establish the identity of the person who had sexual contact with
the complainant on the occasion set out in the charge; or
c) it is evidence of sexual activity that took place on the same occasion as the
sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge where that
evidence relates to the consent the accused alleges he believed was given
by the complainant.128
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The amendments also made evidence of sexual reputation inadmissible “for the
purpose of challenging or supporting the credibility of the complainant.129
However, in R v Seaboyer130 (1991), the Supreme Court struck down the 1983
Criminal Code amendments restricting sexual history evidence on the grounds that
the restrictions were in violation of defendants’ constitutional legal rights.131 The
Court determined that there may in fact, be additional situations in which the
complainant’s sexual history could be relevant and admissible.132

Conversely, the

Supreme Court held that section 277 of the Criminal Code which excludes sexual
reputation evidence, does not infringe on the accused’s right to a fair trial.
McLachlin J., writing for the majority stated:
Section 277 excludes evidence of sexual reputation for the purpose of
challenging or supporting the credibility of the plaintiff. The idea that a
complainant's credibility might be affected by whether she has had other sexual
experience is today universally discredited. There is no logical or practical link
between a woman's sexual reputation and whether she is a truthful witness. It
follows that the evidence excluded by s. 277 can serve no legitimate purpose in
the trial. Section 277, by limiting the exclusion to a purpose which is clearly
illegitimate, does not touch evidence which may be tendered for valid purposes,
and hence does not infringe the right to a fair trial.133

The Seaboyer decision regarding s. 276 and the admission of sexual history
evidence was not so straight forward. The majority gave several examples of
evidence of sexual conduct “which clearly should be received in the interest of a
fair trial.”134 One of the examples given rests on the concept that the accused may
honestly but mistakenly (and not necessarily reasonably) have believed the
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complainant was consenting to the sexual act” on the basis that the sexual acts were
performed by the complainant at some other time or place. This reasoning is
problematic in that it relies on the myth that if a woman says ‘yes’ at one time, she
is automatically implying consent to future sexual acts. It also implicitly gives
credence to the ‘twin myths’ that unchaste women are less worthy of belief and
more likely than chaste women to consent to the acts giving rise to the charge.135
Other examples of sexual history evidence given by the majority that may be
admissible include: “to explain the complainant’s physical condition; to prove bias
or motive to fabricate; and to establish similar fact conduct on the part of the
complainant.”136
In her partial dissent, then Supreme Court Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé
asserted that the evidence excluded by s. 276 of the Criminal Code is “simply
irrelevant.”137 She rightly observes that sexual history evidence:
has a significant distorting effect at trial…such evidence allows stereotype and
myth to enter into the equation, sidetracks the search for the truth…[and]
invites a result more in accord with stereotype than truth…many a defence
lawyer knows the effect of such evidence and thus strives to get it admitted.138

To illustrate this point, L’Heureux-Dubé quotes a Member of Parliament (a former
lawyer), who during a House of Commons debate on this area of law opined:
The myth is that a 'bad woman' is incapable of being raped. ... We have to deal
with the myth that the credibility of a 'bad woman' is immediately in question. I
was never sure what that phrase meant. As a lawyer, all I knew was that it was
of benefit to hurl as much dirt as possible in the direction of such a woman,
hoping that some of it would stick and that the jury would disbelieve what she
said.139
135
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In summary, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé states:
Sexual history evidence excluded by s. 276 of the Criminal Code is mostly
irrelevant and, moreover, so prejudicial that its exclusion both at common law
and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is mandated. Neither
s. 7 nor s. 11(d), upon a principled inquiry, directs a different conclusion.
However, even assuming that s. 276 is unconstitutional in its effect, it is easily
justified under s. 1. In my view, once the constitutional questions are viewed
within their larger context, the conclusions reached in these reasons are
absolutely uncontentious.140

That only one other Supreme Court Judge (Gonthier J.) concurred with L’HeureuxDubé’s dissent is demonstrative of judicial resistance and the Supreme Court’s
inability and/or refusal to fully recognize the extent to which the harms to the
victim in sexual assaults cases can outweigh the benefit to the accused.
In response to public outrage and feminist lobbying following the Seaboyer
decision, Parliament re-enacted the “rape shield provisions” (albeit, in a weakened
form that accorded with the majority’s insistence on a broad scope for judicial
discretion141) with the introduction of Bill C-49.142 The Act once again made it
clear that sexual history evidence cannot be used to support the inference arising
from the twin myths respecting credibility and consent.143 It also sought to “limit
the traditional uses of sexual history evidence by reframing the Criminal Code’s
construction of consent and ‘mistaken belief in consent.’”144 Thus, in addition to
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redefining the rules surrounding the admission of sexual history evidence, the
reform saw the enactment of a statutory definition of consent as voluntary
agreement,145 the enumeration of situations of forced submission that do not
constitute consent,146 and limitations of the defence of mistaken belief in consent.147
Defence lawyers were quick to challenge the constitutionally of the
amendment, arguing that it violated defendants’ right to full answer and defence.148
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the law in R v Darrach (2000);149 however,
the decision disappointingly failed to give any meaning to the prejudicial effects of
sexual history evidence or the ways in which this type of evidence reinforces
gender inequalities. The decision also stated that in cases where it is unclear
whether the evidence should be admitted, the judge should admit the evidence.150
Busby observes that Gotell’s 2006 research on sexual history applications after
Darrach “reveals that lower court judges have taken their lead from the Supreme
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Court, because there is not a single case in which a lower court judge has seriously
considered gendered inequality or the prejudicial effects of sexual history
evidence.”151 Gotell’s research also reveals “that judges have permitted sexual
history evidence in 53 percent of the cases in which defence counsel sought to have
it admitted, belying the Court’s prediction in Seaboyer that the evidence would only
be admitted in exceptional cases.”152
The use of sexual history evidence is prevalent in cases regarding sexual
abuse in intimate relationships. As mentioned previously, the marital exemption,
whereby it was not possible for a husband to be charged for sexually assaulting his
wife, was removed in 1983.153 Despite the statutory restrictions on the use of sexual
history evidence “defence lawyers continue to argue that sexual history must be
admitted in the context of long-term relationships.”154 Ruthy Lazar’s research
illustrates this point. In conducting interviews with defence attorneys regarding the
admission of sexual history evidence, Lazar observed that 12 of the 15 interviewed
“asserted that they use, or seek to use, evidence of sexual history in cases of
wife/partner rape.”155
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For example, in the case of R v J.A. (2011),156 in which the accused anally
penetrated his partner with a dildo after he had choked her into unconsciousness,
sexual history evidence was admitted without a voir dire on admissibility, to infer
that because the victim had consented to sado-masochistic sexual activities with the
accused before, she had likely consented to the activity set out in the charge. The
appeal court set aside the conviction and dismissed the charges without
commenting “on the propriety of ignoring the Criminal Code dictate that a voir dire
must be held” prior to admitting sexual history evidence.157 In a landmark decision,
the Supreme Court overturned the appeal court’s decision “on the basis that an
unconscious person could not consent to sexual activity.”158 However, the Supreme
Court failed to address the admittance of sexual history evidence without a voir
dire.
Sexual history evidence has also been used questionably to demonstrate
sexual inactivity. In R v Antonelli (2011),159 “the trial judge found a history of
sexual inactivity admissible to allow the defence to argue that the complainant was
more likely to have fabricated the allegations.”160 Karen Busby observes that in
this case, “the defence sought, and succeeded, to admit evidence to create a new
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sexual assault myth: Women who were previously chaste are more likely to
fabricate complaints.”161
Busby also notes a particularly troubling indirect use of sexual history
evidence. Following the passage of Bill C-49 and increasingly after Darrach
(2002), defence counsel have been seeking to admit evidence that the complainant
has been sexually abused in the past and because of this abuse “she has a disordered
sexual perception that could lead to misinterpretations, overreactions and false
criminal accusations,” and therefore, her credibility is at issue.162 Additionally,
sexual history evidence is used to discredit complainants who “fail to maintain an
appropriate demeanor,” or who demonstrate anger towards the accused.163 For
example, in R v Sanichar (2012), the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the
defendant’s conviction because of ‘the trial judges inadequate examination of
credibility in light of the historical nature of the abuse and the defendant’s
anger.”164 The complainant was a young teenager at the time the abuse had
occurred. She had reported the abuse to the police, a school counselor, and a
worker from the Children’s Aid Society. Additionally, the accused (the victim’s
step-father) had faced prior charges for the assaults. As a young woman, the
complainant wrote a letter to the defendant expressing her anger. In its decision,
the Court inferred that the complainant’s dislike for the defendant that she
expressed in the letter may have given reason for her to fabricate the complaints:
In the appellant's submission, the letter epitomizes the hatred the complainant
bears towards him and that hatred provides the true motivation for what he
161
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argues are the false charges against him. While the letter does refer to some
allegations of physical and sexual abuse, it is more or less venomous in other
respects as well.165

This disturbing decision ignores the trauma experienced by experienced by
sexual assault victims. Feelings of anger are a normal reaction to childhood sexual
abuse.166 In this decision, the Court has taken what was likely a part of the victim’s
healing experience and warped it in such a way that it was used to discredit her.
Although the appeal court’s decision was overturned by the Supreme Court in
2013167, “the decision is still evidence of the pervasive judicial attitude towards
victim demeanor.”168 Despite the substantive provisions in the Criminal Code,
“defence lawyer’s direct and indirect uses of sexual history evidence remains a
powerful tool to undermine the credibility of the Crown’s chief (and often the only)
witness – the complainant.”169 Indeed, Janine Benedet asserts “the use of sexual
history evidence is not wrong because it constitutes an invasion of privacy, but
because it undermines sexual equality.”170
Access to Third Party Records
The rise of the defence counsel practice of seeking disclosure of personal
records in sexual assault cases began in the early 1990’s, coinciding with the
amendments to the Criminal Code restricting questioning about sexual history.171
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By the late 1990s, this defence tactic to circumvent sexual history evidence rules
was being used regularly to discredit women and children’s claims of sexual
violation.172 Employing this relatively new tactic, defence lawyers seek access to
every imaginable personal record including counselling, therapy and psychiatric
records, records from abortion and birth control clinics, child welfare agencies,
adoption agencies, residential and public schools, drug and alcohol rehabilitation
centers, medical doctors, military records, criminal injuries compensation boards,
prisons and youth detention centers, social welfare agencies, victim/witness
assistance programs, medical doctors, immigration offices, sexual assault crisis
centers and personal diaries.173 These records are sought almost exclusively in
sexual assault cases.174
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R v O’Connor175 established a
common-law test for the production and disclosure to the defence of third party
records that were not already in the possession of the Crown. This decision
precipitated a period of wide open access to complainants’ records on the basis that
access was paramount to a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.176
O’Connor, who had been a priest at a residential school, was charged with having
committed sexual offences against four Indigenous women in the 1960’s while they
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were students or recent graduates employed at the residential school. A judge
ordered the women to authorize the release to O’Connor of an all-encompassing
compilation of personal records, which included their residential school records.
Lise Gotell observes that the residential school records “had been coercively
obtained within the context of a residential school system that functioned as a
highly effective instrument in the forced assimilation of Canadian aboriginal
peoples.”177 In ordering production of these records, “the Court avoided having to
consider whether records written by a defendant himself (as the records almost
certainly were in O’Connor) are inherently unreliable.”178 In addition, the Court
did not consider how records applications “would have a disproportionate impact
on women who have been subject to extensive record keeping in contexts
characterized by multiple inequalities such as prisons, psychiatric hospitals or the
child welfare system.”179
As the records went back over 30 years, many of them had been destroyed.
Consequently, the trial judge ordered the proceedings stayed for failure to produce.
The Supreme Court overturned the stay; however, it gave defence counsel wide
access to the personal records of complainants held by third parties.180 In response
to feminist pressures and mounting evidence of the flood of applications for third
party records after O’Connor, Parliament enacted Bill C-46, An Act to Amend the
Criminal Code (Production of Records in Sexual Offence Proceedings) in 1997.181
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The Bill created a substantive legislative framework (encompassed in subsections
278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code) that was designed to subject applications for
production to a higher level of scrutiny.182
The provisions established a rigorous two stage test for the production and
disclosure of records. In the first stage, defence must make a written application to
the trial judge that must specify how the record is ‘likely relevant’ to an issue at
trial and how production of the record is ‘necessary in the interests of justice.’183 In
determining whether to order production of the record for viewing, the judge must
consider the factors enumerated in s. 278.5 (2) of the Criminal Code.184 If the
records pass the first stage test, “these same factors are to guide the judge in
deciding on whether the documents or edited portions are to be disclosed to the
accused.”185 Lise Gotell notes that “this two stage test is skewed in favour of
production on the basis of the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.”186
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(c) the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the record;
(d) whether production of the record is based on a discriminatory belief or bias;
(e) the potential prejudice to the personal dignity and right to privacy of any person to whom the
record relates;
(f) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences;
(g) society’s interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual offences;
and
(h) the effect of the determination on the integrity of the trial process.
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Within months of its passage, the Bill C-46 amendment was subject to
numerous constitutional challenges and was struck down in several controversial
lower court decisions.187 In R v Mills (1999),188 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, thereby upholding the statutory test for access. 189
However, Gotell observes that “a careful scrutiny of Mills…demonstrates how the
meaning of the federal government’s disclosure legislation was seriously
undermined in a decision that privileges defendant’s rights and emphasizes the
importance of judicial discretion and authority in decisions about access.”190 Busby
notes the similarities in R v Darrach (2000) regarding Bill C-49, and R v Mills
(1999) regarding Bill C-46. In both cases, the Supreme Court “gave lip service to
the requirement that women’s equality and privacy rights should be balanced
against the defendant’s right to a fair trial, but gave no meaningful content to the
balancing act.”191 Additionally, in both cases the Court stated that if there was any
doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of producing the records/sexual
history evidence.
Prior to the Bill C-46 amendment, “one strategy adopted by some record
keepers, particularly sexual assault counsellors, was to alter note-taking practices
(remembering always that the defendant might read the record) and revise record
retention polices.”192 Such was the case in R v Carosella (1997).193 “Under a
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policy of destroying all records with police involvement, a sexual assault crisis
center had shredded files relating to a meeting in which a woman inquired into
procedures for laying a complaint of historical sexual assault.”194 The Supreme
Court, with a bare majority, concluded that the charges should be stayed, arguing
that the “accused’s legal rights were irrevocably violated through the actions of the
center.”195 In her dissent, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, with three other Justices
concurring,196 “was of the view that any loss was no more than a mere speculative
risk to the appellant’s rights…[and] if a proper inquiry into the need for the
documents had been held, these notes would not even have met the standard for
production to the trial judge.”197
David Paciocco is critical of the dissenting opinion in Carosella. He argues
that “the conduct of the Sexual Assault Crisis Center was outrageous…the crisis
center sought to destroy any evidence that could assist the defence and it sought to
frustrate the operations of the law.198 This was likely not the case at all. Rather,
the crisis center’s goal in destroying the records was to protect victims of sexual
assault, not to subvert the course of justice. In her dissent, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
notes the detrimental effect that generous production orders have on victims and
those charged with helping them:
I must comment upon the fact that these agencies have even felt it necessary to
go to such lengths. From a quick perusal of lower court judgments, it would
appear as if a request for therapeutic records in cases of sexual assault is
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becoming virtually automatic, with little regard to the actual relevancy of the
documents. We have now come to a situation where people trying to help
victims have resorted to foregoing the taking of notes or destroying them en
masse in order to prevent what they see as a grave injustice. It is extremely
likely that the therapeutical process for which these notes are actually created
is being harmed in their absence.199

Additionally, in this decision, the majority failed to consider the probative value in light
of the nature of the records in question. For example, in Mills it was noted that
‘counselling or therapeutic records…can be highly subjective documents which attempt
merely to record an individual's emotions and psychological state. Often such records
have not been checked for accuracy by the subject of the records, nor have they been
recorded verbatim.”200 Interestingly, despite his critique of the dissenting opinion,
Paciocco recognizes “that these kinds of things can diminish the reliability and hence the
importance of the record.”201
Several judges have commented on the difficulty of “assessing the
deleterious and salutary effects at the stage of production to a judge.”202 For
example, in R v M. (H.A.) (1998), the judge held that “it is difficult for me to sort
out the various material…in the spirit of R v Stinchcombe…it is my view that the
file, as a whole, should be produced.”203 In other words, the judge ordered all
records to be produced because they were too difficult for him to edit, and thus he
completely disregarded the substantive procedures set out in the Criminal Code.204
Perhaps this is indicative of the necessity to provide judges with training on the
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production of records in sexual assault cases. However, in a 2011 Proceedings of
the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, it was noted by
Senator Angus that there is ‘great pushback’ from the bench on initiatives for
specialized training relating to the production of records.205 The reasons for the
‘pushback’ are not clear in the report.
Even when records are not released, their content influences judicial assessments
of credibility. For example, in R v Hayward (1997), the judge disqualified himself from
trial after hearing an application for production and reviewing the material stating that “I
would expect that the complainant and the accused, knowing that I had gone over all of
those materials, would both have a most reasonable apprehension that I would thereby be
biased.”206 In R v Balabuck (1996), the judge ordered a mistrial after reviewing records,
stating that he was unable to disabuse himself of information he knew about the
complainant and the defendant:
In this case, some of the material that I have reviewed reflects, rightly or
wrongly, adversely upon the defendant and some of it likewise reflects
adversely upon the complainant…I do not consider that justice will be seen to
be done if I proceed with this trial.207

This brings into question the appropriateness of the trial judge as the decision maker on
the production of records.
Conclusion
It is evident that, despite the intentions of the 1992 and 1997 amendments to
effectively balance sexual assault victims’ privacy rights with defendants’ rights to full
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answer and defense, the scales of justice continue to weigh heavily in favour of the
accused. Courtroom controversies surrounding the use of sexual history evidence
abound. Judges persist in granting defence access to complainants’ personal documents
with little regard for the factors enumerated in section 278.5(2) of the Criminal Code,
despite their obligation to follow the rules set down in this legislation.208 The Courts
continue to give lip service to the rules encompassing sexual history evidence and access
to third party records; however, this often amounts to no more than a duplicitous avowal
of adherence to the law, with very little substance.
This is not surprising when deep seated ideals about the ‘truth-seeking’ function
of justice continue not only to outweigh, but often to ignore, the equality rights of
women. Even those who purport to be advocates of protecting sexual assault victims
have difficulty recognizing the gendered and derogatory constructions that are inherent in
the application of the law when it comes to the admission of sexual history evidence and
the production of personal records in sexual assault cases. For example, in his
Questionnaire for Judicial Appointment, recently appointed Ontario Court of Appeal
Justice David M. Paciocco, stated “my research and advocacy has…been cited in support
of a balanced approach to protecting the therapeutic and other private records of victims,
including in sexual assault cases.”209 Yet, his critique of Bill C-46 does not appear to
reflect this statement.210
In 2012, the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs
conducted a Statutory Review on the Provisions and Operation of the Act to Amend the
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Criminal Code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings.)211 The review
concluded with 18 recommendations; however, while the recommendations address the
specialized training on sexual offences and third party records production applications for
prosecutors, there is no mention of specialized training for judges. There continues to be
much reason to be skeptical about whether privacy and equality rights will be
significantly factored into future judicial decisions respecting sexual history evidence or
the production of personal records.
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Chapter 4: Sexual Assault on Trial - Hostile Defence Tactics and the
Intimidating Courtroom
“Business as usual in the courtroom aids patriarchy, not justice.”212
Introduction
The courtroom is a frightening place for many victims of sexual assault. It is here
they are forced to reveal the most intimate details of their victimization in the presence of
strangers, while in an institutionalized setting fraught with patriarchal rituals. It is not
surprising then, that survivors of sexual assault report having little or no faith in
courtroom processes and procedures.213 For example, in a study conducted in 2014, twothirds of the participants expressed their lack of confidence in the court process.214 In this
chapter, I will examine the reasons why sexual assault victims lack confidence in the
court process. This examination with begin with a look at the dubious, and arguably
unethical, advertising techniques used by some defence lawyers to attract clients that
have been charged with sexual assault. These web advertisements, that play on rape
myths to reinforce patriarchal power structures, are accessible to anyone who chooses to
do an online search, including the 22 percent of victims who use the Internet to find
sources of information about the criminal justice system.215 Advertisements such as these
could conceivably frighten a victim before she ever enters the courtroom. Next, I will
attempt to expose the institutionalized practices manifested through courtroom rituals that
make the courtroom such a frightening place for sexual assault victims. Finally, I will
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demonstrate the ways in which the linguistic tactics and of the defence serve to revictimize the victim by undermining her confidence and credibility.216
Making it to the Courtroom
Only a small percentage of sexual assault cases make it to the courtroom.
According to Statistics Canada’s General Social Survey (GSS), as few as five percent of
all sexual assaults in Canada were brought to the attention of the police in 2014.217 In
addition, a recent investigative report by the Globe and Mail, in which data was gathered
from more than 870 police forces across Canada, revealed that one in five sexual assault
claims are dismissed by police as being baseless.218 Of those cases that do make it to
court, only four in ten result in convictions.219 Even when there is a conviction obtained,
conditional sentences are more likely to be entered into for sexual assaults than for any
other violent crime.220
Why do so few women report sexual assaults to the police? Respondents to the
2014 GSS reported many reasons, most which concerned the criminal justice process:
o police wouldn’t have considered the incident important enough – 43%;
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o police would not have been effective – 26%;
o did not want the hassle of dealing with the police – 45%;
o offender would not have been convicted or adequately punished – 40%; and
o feared or did not want the hassle of dealing with the court process – 34%.221
It is evident from the Globe and Mail investigative report, and from the results of
the GSS, that there are problems with police handling of sexual assault complaints, and
with victims’ perceptions of the police. While police policies and processes with regards
to sexual assault complaints are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note
that police “have a crucial role to play in any attempt to implement a strategy designed to
close the gap between the official condemnation of male violence as enshrined in law and
the realities of male violence as condoned in practice.”222 The police are the entry point
for sexual assault cases into the criminal justice system and thereby, into the courtroom.
Additionally, an important aspect of the problem of the sexual harm to victims of the
criminal justice system processing of sexual assault cases involves defence attorneys’
response to, and discourse surrounding allegations of sexual assault.
Problematic Defence Advertising
As Professor David Luban notes, “lawyers are the primary administrators of the
rule of law, the point of contact between citizens and their legal systems.”223 As an
administrator of the rule of law, “a lawyer has a duty to carry on the practice of
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law…honourably and with integrity.”224 It seems however, that when it comes to
defending sexual assault cases, some defence attorneys sacrifice their integrity even
before entering the courtroom with their dubious use of marketing techniques that play on
rape myths to reinforce disparaging patriarchal narratives about the nature of sexual
violence.
Elaine Craig studied the websites of Canadian criminal defence attorneys who
advertise legal representation services to individuals accused of sexual offences and
found that “a significant subset of lawyers who advertise legal representation services to
individuals accused of sexual offences engage in commercial expression that may be
inconsistent with the limits and guidelines specified in their professional codes of
conduct.”225 Craig found that the most common themes about the offence of sexual
assault on the websites examined in the study were: false allegations of sexual assault are
common; sexual assault is prosecuted zealously; and sexual assault complainants are very
likely to be believed by police and prosecutors.226 However, research has proven these
contentions to be false. For example, Holly Johnson notes that out of every 1000 sexual
assaults in Canada, only 33 are reported to the police; 29 are recorded as a crime; 12 have
charges laid; six are prosecuted; and only three lead to conviction.227 Additionally,
according to research from North America, the United Kingdom and Australia, between
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two and eight percent of sexual assault complaints are false.228 Craig notes specific
example of problematic marketing by lawyers with a view to demonstrating how
advertising, which exists within the public domain “contributes to public and legal
discourse, and in this context provides an overt sense of the continued problems with the
legal system’s response to sexual harm.”229
The website of Calgary lawyer Paul Gracia is a prime example of problematic
advertising with regards to sexual assault.230 On his website, the link to the offence of
‘sexual and indecent acts’ features an image of a scantily clad woman, apparently
unconscious, lying face down and spread eagle on a bed. Beside her, there is what
appears to be an empty bottle of wine. The implication here is that women who drink are
“asking for it.” Further, the use of this type image trivializes sexual violence and
enforces “problematic social attitudes about sexuality and gender.”231 Additionally,
Gracia promotes the fact of acquittal of clients who appear to be factually guilty.
Consider the following example:
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Allegations: My client was invited into the complainant’s apartment, where he forced
himself upon her and allegedly sexually assaulted her in her kitchen. There was full
penile penetration from behind, without a condom. The Crown was seeking three years
[sic] incarceration.
Result: The matter went to trial at the Court of Queen’s Bench, after a preliminary
inquiry. The judge found him “Not Guilty,” and acquitted him on the basis of
reasonable doubt, stemming from exculpatory DNA evidence. No criminal
conviction.232

This advertisement informs the reader that a man who had forced sexual
intercourse with a woman was acquitted. It is framed in such a way that the reader
is led to believe that Gracia was responsible for the acquittal. It also further
trivializes sexual violence and “may be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duty to
encourage public respect for the administration of justice,” especially when the
acquittal is left with a vague explanation.233 Craig observes many such instances of
questionable advertising by Canadian criminal defence attorneys with respect to
defending those accused of sexual assault.234 While this dubious legal advertising
is not directly related to the trial itself, it is perhaps indicative of the deep-seated
misogynistic ideals and practices that many defence lawyers bring to the
courtroom, often without conscious malice, but rather as a means to do battle in the
adversarial arena.
The Courtroom
As previously noted, Statistics Canada’s General Social Survey also provides
evidence of victims’ reluctance to report because of the courtroom process itself.235 The
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courtroom is the ‘theatre of criminal justice’236 in which the ritual of the trial takes place.
Retired Ontario Superior Court Justice Marie Corbett describes it as a place of ‘social disease.’237 The courtroom is a “space of ritualized hierarchy… [that renders] some
participants more visible or more audible than others and facilitates certain hierarchal
lines of engagement that distinguish between the learned legal profession and the
laity.”238 In the courtroom, the victim is deprived of her identity. She becomes an object,
referred to as ‘the witness’ or the ‘complainant.’ Conversely, the legal professionals in
the courtroom retain their identities and are typically addressed as subjects: ‘My Learned
Friend,’ My Lord, or ‘Your Honour.” 239 Geitner also distinguishes judges and lawyers
from others present in the courtroom: “it emphasizes their role as something set apart
from the common throng – as members of a learned profession.”240 It is thus, that the
object (the victim) becomes subordinate to the subjects (judge, Crown, defence) and is
forced to submit to the unfamiliar rituals and linguistic scripts of the trial. Indeed, David
Tait observes that “trials have been analyzed as ‘degradation rituals,’ ordeals in which
victims are re-victimized and silenced.241
Elaine Craig notes that “the hierarchal, spatial and aesthetic organization of the
courtroom is compounded by the ritualized presentations of imperialism and colonial
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power present in every criminal trial proceeding in Canada.”242 This can be particularity
unnerving for Aboriginal women, who are disproportionally the victims of sexual
assault.243 For example, the Royal Coat of Arms, with its symbols of “the four founding
nations of Canada: England, Scotland, France, and Ireland,” and its motto proclaiming
colonial rule A Mari Usque Ad Mare (from sea to sea)244 is prominently displayed in
many Canadian courtrooms.245 The presence of the monarchy is further manifested in the
role of the Crown Attorney.246 Additionally, the display of official judicial portraits that
often line the hallways and courtroom walls of Canadian courthouses, serve to express
“the qualities and characteristics of the state” as inherently masculine, colonial and
Caucasian.247
The physical positioning of trial participants may also incite a sense of ‘dis-ease’
in victims who are testifying. The vulnerability associated with this role “is compounded
by the inferior position of the complainant relative to other trial participants such as the
lawyers and judges.”248 Judges typically sit behind an elevated bench at the front and
center of the courtroom, thereby, allowing the judge to physically ‘look down’ upon the
witness as he sits in judgement.249 When testifying, the victim, alone in the witness box,
is at center stage in the ‘theatre of the courtroom.” Judges and lawyers ask questions that
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she is obliged to answer. All eyes are on her as she reveals the intimate details of her
victimization. Courtroom rituals do not allow for her to have a trusted individual beside
her for support. She must remain in this incredibly vulnerable physical position until she
is give permission to leave the witness stand. Thus, it is evident that there is a profound
power differential in the courtroom that crushes that victim’s voice and does not allow
her to tell her story in her own words.
Telling the Story
Over the past 40 years, researchers have developed a wealth of empirical
research that has led to a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that
influence the quality and quantity of evidence provided by witnesses to a crime.250
“One of the primary predictors of completeness and accuracy of eyewitness
evidence is the way the witness is questioned…researchers agree that the ‘gold
standard’ questions are open-ended questions that encourage the witness to freely
recall events.”251 (e.g. What happened?) As questions become more specific, the
witness moves from providing information from memory (a recall task) to “making
judgements about information provided by the interviewer” (a recognition task),
and it is this information that can contaminate the witness’s memory.252 If an
interviewer’s questions imply a particular answer, witnesses are more likely to
respond with an answer that meets that expectation.253 This is why open questions
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(e.g. What happened next?) are preferable to closed (e.g. Were you wearing a bra?)
and leading (e.g. You wanted to have sex, didn’t you) questions.254
In addition to the memory benefits of using open-ended questions,
“enabling complainants to give comprehensive responses is also likely to improve
their experience of the criminal justice process.”255 Studies suggest that “current
courtroom questioning practices are unlikely to elicit the most complete and
accurate information from complainants; nor are they likely to give the complainant
a voice in the courtroom.”256 The rituals of courtroom questioning do not allow a
victim to tell her story in a way that makes the most sense to her. Her narrative
flow is constantly interrupted by counsel’s questions. This can lead to
complications in the courtroom, not only with the telling of the story, but also with
the ways in which the judge and/or jury comprehend and frame the story to make
sense of it. Andrew Taslitz observes that humans think in terms of stories that they
are familiar with.257 Jury research has shown that jurors apply their existing stories
to witness testimony to assist them in determining who to believe. According to
Taslitz:
Juries convert evidence into familiar stories, filling in gaps in the evidence where
needed to craft a coherent tale. Whom jurors believe turns on the consistency of each
witness’s testimony with the plausible stories that juries create based upon their
preexisting stock. These stock stories come from experience and culture, tales learned
from the Bible, children’s tales, television, radio, books, magazines, and movies.
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Stories create our world of meaning; they are the lens through which we view all of
life’s events. Many of these stories tend to channel the political and economic power
that our society most values to men and to privilege male perceptions of reality.258

These patriarchal stories are evident in the scripts that are played out in
sexual assault cases in the ‘theatre of justice.” Patriarchal rape tales, “about why
and when it happens, and to and by whom; gender-role stories about the sexes’
similarities and differences, motivations and needs, strengths and weaknesses;”
stories presenting women as hypersexual, selfish liars are all too common in the
courtroom.259 Gendered stories are not the only tales that prevail in sexual assault
cases; race and class are also part of the story.
As mentioned previously, Aboriginal women suffer disproportionately high
rates of sexual violence in Canada.260 Research has shown that Aboriginal women
are “less likely to report a sexual assault committed by a White man if they fear
their complaint would not be believed.”261 In those cases resulting in conviction
that involve a sexual assault against a Native woman by a Native man, it is
impossible to know if the conviction resulted “from the Native complainant being
believed more frequently, or whether the Native accused was believed to be more
capable of the offence with which he was charged.”262 Nightingale observes “many
jurors do not believe any accused person to be innocent until proven guilty, and that
an accused from a minority group is seen as even less likely to be innocent than
others.”263 As these patriarchal tales of gender, race and class play out in the
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courtroom, victim’s voices are constrained; their stories are dissected and distorted;
and they are re-victimized by the very system that purports to protect them.
Moreover, defence lawyers often use manipulative tactics to undermine
victims’ stories and scrutinize their sexual history in court. David Tanovich
observes that many “defence lawyers have no hesitation in leaving their ethics at
the courtroom door so as to exploit and perpetrate stereotypes about women and
sexual assault in defence of their clients.”264 This is particularly evident during
cross-examination.
“Whack” the Complainant
“The right to cross-examine a witness is considered a fundamental aspect of
the adversarial legal process because it allows the evidence presented in the
courtroom to be tested…for inaccuracies or inconsistencies that could render it
unreliable.”265 However, in sexual assault cases discrediting the complainant “is a
central strategy in the armoury of defence counsel, and this practice takes the form
of maligning her behaviour, her dress and her character – all in a sexualized
way.”266 Law Professor David Tanovich calls attention to the phrase “Whack the
Complainant hard” that was coined by leading criminal defence lawyer Michael
Edelson at a 1988 continuing legal education conference in Ottawa.267 In reference
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to the cross-examination of sexual assault complainants, Edelson advised his
colleagues to:
Whack the complainant hard at the preliminary hearing…generally, if you destroy the
complainant in a prosecution, you destroy the head. You cut off the head of the
Crown’s case and the case is dead…and you’ve got to attack the complainant hard
with all you’ve got so that he or she will say: “I’m not coming back in front of 12 good
citizens to repeat this bullshit story that I’ve just told the judge.268

Although Edelson met with criticism from women’s groups after his comments,
criminal defence attorneys seemingly embraced his advice. More recently, Paul Cooper, a
senior member of the Toronto criminal defence bar advised young defence counsel that
they must “kill the witness on cross in sexual assault cases.” 269 Equally troubling is the
backlash that ensued after the release of former Supreme Court Justice Claire L’HeureuxDubé’s 1999 decision in R v Ewanchuk. In Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s decision, she was
critical of the lower court’s judgement and the ways in which the myths surrounding
sexual assault continue to influence judicial decisions.270 Members of the Criminal
Defence Bar quickly came to the defence of Justice McClung of the Alberta Court of
Appeal, who had written a letter to the National Post attacking Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
the day after his decision was reversed in Ewanchuk.271
McClung’s decision had all the elements of a patriarchal tale. For example, he
made assertions such as “it must be pointed out that the complainant did not present
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herself…in a bonnet and crinolines,”272 and “the sum of the evidence indicates that
Ewanchuk’s advances to the complainant were far less criminal than hormonal…in a less
litigious age going too far in the boyfriend’s car was better dealt with onsite – a wellchosen expletive, a slap in the face or, if necessary, a well-directed knee.”273 Constance
Backhouse notes that the “strongest invective [against Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s
decision] came from Edward L. Greenspan, a Toronto defence lawyer notorious for his
outspoken critiques of feminism.”274 Greenspan contributed to the patriarchal tale by
proclaiming that “the feminist perspective has hijacked the Supreme Court of
Canada,275”and that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s decision was nothing more than “a
sermon of feminist theology disguised as a legal opinion.”276 As Tanovich points out,
Greenspan’s narrative “no doubt sent a powerful message to defence lawyers about the
need to keep up the war and to continue their ‘whacking.’”277 One of the ways in which
defence lawyers attempt to ‘whack’ the complainant is by employing dubious tactics to
evade the rules surrounding the admission of sexual history evidence and victims’
personal records held by third parties.
Dubious Defence Tactics – Sexual History and Third Party Records
As discussed in Chapter 3, sexual history and sexual reputation evidence was
made inadmissible, subject to several exceptions, with the 1983 Criminal Code
amendments.278 However, in R v Seaboyer279 (1991), the Supreme Court struck down the
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1983 Criminal Code amendments restricting sexual history evidence on the grounds that
the restrictions were in violation of defendants’ constitutional legal rights.280 In response
to public outrage and feminist lobbying following the Seaboyer decision, Parliament reenacted the “rape shield provisions” with the introduction of Bill C-49.281 Despite these
legislative reforms, defence counsel continue to use complainants’ sexual history
evidence indirectly by relying on “stereotypes held by judges and juries about the
credibility of certain ‘kinds’ of women…what does information about a complainant’s
work, dress, motherhood or marital status, (dis)ability, attitude and demeanor, or abuse
history suggest about her credibility?”282
For example, Craig notes a case at the Alberta Provincial Court where a
complainant was “cross-examined extensively about whether she had smoked marijuana
[the evening of the attack], whether she was flirting [with the accused] early that night,
the precise number of beer she consumed the day and evening before the assault, and
whether she was wearing a bra.”283 The inference here is that the ‘kind’ of woman who
smokes drugs, drinks alcohol, flirts with men, and doesn’t wear a bra is the ‘kind’ of
woman who not a credible witness, and therefor, she was most likely ‘asking for it.’ The
trial judge in this case described the defence counsel’s cross-examination as
“unnecessarily confrontational…and concluded that it was getting ‘out of hand’ and that
‘most of all [he] had a sense that she was truly being and felt insulted by the process.”284
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The accused was convicted; however, the “Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the
conviction and ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge’s interventions created
the perception of unfairness.285
Busby notes that most defence lawyers thought the ‘rape shield laws’ went too far
in restricting their ability to represent clients in sexual assault trials.286 According to
Busby, defence counsel lost little time in developing a tactic to circumvent the sexual
history evidence rules: “if they could not intimidate or undermine complainants by
dragging their sexual lives into court, they would seek access to any personal records
about a complainant that might contain other embarrassing or discrediting
information...”287 In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R v O’Connor288 established
a common-law test for the production and disclosure to the defence of third party records
that were not already in the possession of the Crown. This decision precipitated a period
of wide open access to complainants’ records on the basis that access was paramount to a
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.289 In response to feminist pressures and
mounting evidence of the flood of applications for third party records after O’Connor,
Parliament enacted Bill C-46, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Production of
Records in Sexual Offence Proceedings) in 1997.290 The Bill created a substantive
legislative framework (encompassed in subsections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code)
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that was designed to subject applications for production to a higher level of scrutiny. 291
Within months of its passage, the Bill C-46 amendment was subject to numerous
constitutional challenges and was struck down in several controversial lower court
decisions.292 In R v Mills (1999)293, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Act, thereby upholding the statutory test for access.294 Despite these legislative
amendments to the Criminal Code, “complainants remain vulnerable to defence practices
of sexual history interrogation and confidential records disclosure.”295
Questionable Questioning Tactics on Cross-Examination
As David Taslitz observes, “the adversary system is aptly named…the system
assumes that trials achieve truth through the clash of equally matched adversaries.296
Thus the courtroom becomes an arena of linguistic combat and the victim is merely a
pawn that is subject to brutalization and re-traumatization in the adversarial contest. The
form of communication is formal, heavily scripted and rigid… “there are rules regulating
who can speak, to whom and when.” 297 Defence counsel skillfully manipulate the use of
language to achieve their goal of winning the contest. “In putting forward the client’s
perspective, the defence lawyer tells a story by leading the complainant through the
defendant’s version of events…the complainant’s responses are virtually superfluous to
the proceedings; the defence lawyer’s job is to put an alternative story to the factfinders
to create reasonable doubt.”298
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Defence lawyers often use linguistic tactics to skillfully circumvent the rules
prohibiting sexual history evidence. David Taslitz gives the example of a gang rape trial
in which the victim, on direct examination, had testified that her assailants had not
ejaculated. Consider the following from the cross-examination that ensued:
Defence: Would you explain to me why you think they didn’t?
Victim: I just do.
Defence: Do you know what that feels like?
Victim: Yes.
Defence: To have someone climax inside of you?
Prosecutor: Objection, your honour.
Judge: Objection sustained.
Defence: Your Honour, I’m not delving into this woman’s past sexual history.
Prosecutor: Objection to this speech your Honour.
Judge: The Court understands your reason, Counsel, and objection sustained.299

In this example, “although the objection was sustained, defence’s counsel’s
questions sought to imply that the victim had an active sex life without directly so
asking…by indirection, therefore, counsel sought a way around the rape shield laws.”300
Despite the sustained objection, the seed was planted in the collective mind of the jury
that the victim was promiscuous as she knew what it felt like to have someone ejaculate
inside her.
In another example, Taslitz uses the transcript from the William Kennedy rape
trial in the United States to demonstrate how the defence counsel skillfully employs
language to imply the that victim had consented:
Defence: Now you said that after you left the - uh – Kennedy home that you felt dirty. Is
that correct?
Victim: I felt dirty before I left the home.
Defence: When you drove home you still had the same panties on.
Victim: Yes sir.
Defence: When you got to your house, you stayed there for several hours without
removing those panties.
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Victim: I-I’m not quite sure how long I was at my house, but I, but I – the underwear was
still on me.
Defence: It was at least a couple of hours, wasn’t it?
Victim: I’m not sure.
Defence: And when you went to your mother’s house, you kept those same panties on,
didn’t you?
Victim: Yes.
Defence: And when you went from your mother’s house to go pick up Johnny Butler, you
still wore the same panties.
Victim: I was pretty terrorized, I – I – I’d never, I just, it’s like you’re – you’re just
functioning, and – and to be at the sheriff’s office? And I was just, just…
Defence: Even though you – you – felt dirty, you felt awful, and what have you, you kept
those same panties – on is that what you said, Miss Bowman?
Victim: I-I couldn’t think to, I, I didn’t know what to think.301

Whether the victim left her panties on after the assault has nothing to do with
consent. However, defence cleverly manipulates the cross-examination to imply that
how long the victim left her panties on was relevant to whether she consented. The
implication is that, had she not consented, she would have removed her panties at the first
possible opportunity to rid herself of the source of her ‘pollution.’ The use of the word
‘panties’, rather than the more gender neutral ‘underwear’ is also significant. The word
‘panties’ suggests an item of clothing that is specifically female, personal, and intimate an item of clothing that guards the female genitalia. Defence also insinuates that because
she did not remove her panties as soon as possible after that assault, her source of
‘dirtiness’ did not come from being raped, but rather from her own shame at having had
casual sex with a stranger.
Defence’s control over how long a victim may speak means that the lawyer does
most of the talking.302 The lawyer’s domination of linguistic space aids his credibility and
allows him to construct vivid detailed images of what he wants the judge/jury to
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believe.303 Additionally, the use of leading questions and insistence on particular
answers, a common practice for defence counsel, allows the lawyer to “exert significant
control over a sexual assault complainant’s testimony…there is very little opportunity
for…[her] to seek clarification, express concerns, or contribute to the direction of the
exchange.”304 Furthermore, forced choice questions – those that require a yes or no
answer – limit the victim’s independent voice.305 In a Canadian practice guide for
lawyers defending sexual assault cases, Michelle Fuerst advises defence counsel to “use
leading questions to increase the likelihood of favourable responses” when questioning
child witnesses.306 These ‘favourable responses’ that the defence seeks can serve to
“distort the accuracy of the complainant’s testimony…[and] it can also be degrading for
them.”307
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have called attention to the institutionalized practices manifested
through courtroom rituals that make the courtroom such a frightening place for sexual
assault victims. I have also demonstrated the ways in which the linguistic tactics of the
defence serve to undermine the confidence and credibility of victims of sexual assault. In
order to access the purported protection of the justice system “a sexual assault
complainant must recount the details of acts that may be experienced as intensely
personal, almost unspeakable, while at the same time following a scripted form of
dialogue which confines them to a particular highly schematized role.”308 As Elaine
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Craig points out the legal processes and courtroom practices used to respond to sexual
assault, may in fact “reify the very social dynamics that produce both sexual violence
itself and the impact of this gendered harm on its subjects.”309 When complainants seek
protection from the criminal justice system, they become powerless in a system that
continues their victimization through the application of patriarchal scripts and the
ritualized undoing of the victim. It is evident that the application of the law continues to
subordinate women to patriarchal discourse surrounding women’s sexuality. As the
adversarial system necessitates the often-demeaning linguistic combat that occurs in the
arena of the courtroom, we must question its suitability for trying sexual assault cases.
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Chapter 5: The Way Forward
It is evident that, despite the many positive reforms in the laws surrounding sexual
assault that have taken place in Canada over the past three and a half decades, many
problems with the legal response to sexual assault remain. Foremost among these
problems is the myriad of myths and stereotypes about sexual assault victims that are
deeply ingrained in Western society, and thereby in the justice system. The justice
system, which includes police, defence, prosecutors and the courts, like society in
general, is affected by victim-blaming myths about sexual assault and those who work in
it may regard complainants with skepticism, disbelief, or with victim-blaming attitudes.
Indeed, many problems with the legal response to sexual assault are deeply rooted in
these underlying misogynistic ideals that have plagued women since long before the
beginnings of today’s major world religions.310 These ideals can lurk subconsciously in
the minds of both men and women, and often emerge when confronted with notions of
women’s sexuality.
The legal system – from the police through to the courts – should play a major
role in dispelling these myths and stereotypes. Comments such as those made by Justice
McClung in R v Ewanchuk – “it must be pointed out that the complainant did not present
herself to Ewanchuk or enter his trailer in a bonnet and crinolines”311 – serve not only to
reinforce rape myths, but also to shift the blame for an assault onto the victim and deny
women fair treatment in sexual assault cases. As noted in Chapter Two, many rape
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myths have been recognized and denounced by the Supreme Court of Canada,312 but
despite this denunciation, the myths continue to infiltrate the legal system.
In a recent interview, Professor Holly Johnson observed that “we have an
accumulating body of evidence that shows that we are doing an abysmal job in dealing
with sexual violence in the law. Police very often do not lay charges. They hold women
accountable, and not the perpetrators. Only half of those [cases] that go to court result in
a conviction.”313 Johnson’s comments were in response to the Statistics Canada’s 2014
General Social Survey which revealed that “self-reported sexual assault rates have
remained the same, despite a decrease in other types of violent and non-violent crime.”314
It is obvious that much more work needs to be done to improve Canadian sexual assault
law at all levels of the justice system including the police, as they are the entry point for
sexual assault complaints into the justice system.
Police Handling of Sexual Assault Complaints
A report published by the Globe and Mail in February 2017 following a 20-month
investigation revealed that one out of every five sexual assault allegations in Canada is
dismissed by the police as being baseless and thus is categorized as “unfounded.”315 This
report has sparked a reaction from numerous police forces nationwide who are now
reviewing their practices with regards to sexual assault complaints. For example,
Ontario’s London Police Service is now conducting “a sweeping review of how its
officers handle sexual assault allegations, an audit that will include probing hundreds of
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cases dating back to 2010 that were dismissed as unfounded.”316 It is too soon to tell if
these reviews will have a positive effect on police practices involving sexual assault
complaints; however, it is notable that some police forces are adopting the “Philadelphia
Model” as a means to improve the problems highlighted in The Globe and Mail
exposé.317 The Philadelphia Model was created and implemented by the Women’s Law
Project318 in 2000, following an investigative report by the Philadelphia Inquirer that
revealed numerous problems with the way the Philadelphia Police were handling sexual
assault complaints. Under the model, each year a team from the woman’s Law Project
joins a team of advocates at the police station in Philadelphia to review all unfounded
rape complaints along with a random sample of open cases. They “assess the
thoroughness and outcome of each investigation, raise questions and provide
feedback.”319 This case review method, now recognized as a best practice in the United
States, certainly has the potential to improve police handling of sexual assault complaints
in Canada at the entry level, but what can be done to improve the court’s handling of
these cases once they come to trial?
Specialized Courts for Sexual Assault?
An idea put forward by advocates of sexual assault law reform, particularly in the
wake of the 2016 conclusion of the Ghomeshi trail, was that of the creation of specialized
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sexual-assault courts. Specialized courts are not new in Canada. For example, many
jurisdictions have specialized domestic violence courts. There are also specialized courts
for First Nations, specialized courts for offenders with long term drug addictions, and
specialized courts for those with mental health issues.320 These courts are presided over
by judges who have specialized knowledge in their respective areas.
As observed in the preceding chapters, sexual assault law is complicated. For
example, judges with little expertise in sexual assault law, often allow the production of
third-party records without a thorough review of the factors enumerated in s.278.5 of the
Criminal Code. For example, in the case of R v M (H.A.) (mentioned in chapter 3) the
judge, being disinclined to sort through the various material held that “it is my view that
the file, as a whole, should be produced.”321 Judges have also disqualified themselves
from cases after reviewing such records, noting that they could not disabuse themselves
of the knowledge that they had gained when reviewing the records.322 Perhaps a partial
solution is a specialized court system in which specific judges who will not be hearing
the case at hand, review third party records in order to decide what shall be produced.
Lawyer, Clodage O’Connell notes another problem with the current system: “The
accused in a sexual-assault trial has the right to a government-funded lawyer if they
cannot afford to retain counsel. Complainants do not…if they do pay to retain a
lawyer, their lawyer has no standing in court. Their lawyer can brief them on what to
expect when they are put on the stand at trial, but once in the courtroom, the
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complainant is very much on their own.” 323 In some cases, the Crown attorney takes
the time to brief sexual assault complainants on what to expect in the courtroom;
however, this is not the norm. More often, Crown lawyers have very little time
available to provide complainants with any type of preparation or support. It has been
suggested that specialized sexual assault courts would provide complainants with legal
assistance to help guide and support them through the trial process.
Additionally, specialized courts would provide a stronger possibility of having
court personnel that are experienced in the unique characteristics of sexual violence
against women and the intricacies of sexual assault law, thereby, allowing for the more
sensitive and efficient processing of sexual assault cases. This would in turn reduce
the burden on both victims and the judicial system. Specialized courts also have the
potential to better address the needs of sexual assault complainants by ensuring easily
accessible psychosocial support to avoid re-traumatization. Additionally, these courts
could conceivably increase reliability and consistency by ensuring that judges and
prosecutors have sufficient training and broad experience.
Currently, the best known specialized court dealing with sexual assault is that
used in South Africa.324 In 2005 there were more than 60 specialist courts in South
Africa hearing sexual offence cases. South Africa has developed a blueprint that “sets
out the essential requirements for the Sexual Offences Courts and covers both personnel
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requirements and equipment and location requirements.”325 The South African courts
were designed to tackle low rates of convictions for sexual offences and to “mitigate the
hardships encountered by complainants in the ordinary courts…. they have been
successful in both respects.”326 This is certainly an area worthy of exploration in Canada.
While Canada has no experience with specialized courts for sexual offences, there
is a body of knowledge from the use of specialized courts for other offences from which
it may draw. We can also draw from the South African blueprint and lessons learned.
The South African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has published
a detailed report on the establishment of sexual offence courts that may be a good starting
point for exploring the viability of specialized sexual assault courts in Canada.327
Whether or not specialized courts are created, it is worthwhile to examine the court
procedures that have been implemented in other countries in hopes of finding potential
methods for improving the legal response to sexual assault in Canada.
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